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BROWN V. SANDERS: INVALID FACTORS AND APPELLATE
REVIEW IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION
Death penalty jurisprudence in America is dynamic. Since Furman
v. Georgia' in 1972, the states and the United States Supreme Court have
elaborated constitutional and practicable systems of capital punishment
and sentencing.2 The Court has worked to ensure that the death penalty
cannot be imposed arbitrarily, and to allow sentencers to review mitigat-
ing factors that can support lesser sentences.3 Meanwhile, state appellate
courts have examined death penalty statutes to ensure they meet revised
sentencing guidelines.4 The Supreme Court has carved out a jurispruden-
tial approach to sentences rendered using invalid sentencing factors after
new statutory factors were found too vague to ensure the constitutional
rights of offenders. 5 The Court has maintained guidelines for valid fac-
tors6 and has addressed cases in which sentences were imposed after a
jury considered factors later determined invalid.7
This comment addresses a recent capital decision by the United
States Supreme Court. Brown v. Sanders8 is the latest in a series of cases
addressing death sentences issued after the consideration of invalid sen-
tencing factors. In deciding Brown, the Supreme Court eliminated the
distinction between "weighing" and "non-weighing" jurisdictions9 which
had been in place for fifteen years.' ° While this change in jurisprudence
will simplify the examination of sentences derived from invalid sentenc-
ing factors, the majority opinion in Brown failed to clarify the role of
appellate review under the new system.
Part I provides an overview of the constitutional requirements for
death sentences, and the approaches taken with respect to invalid sen-
tencing factors. Part II discusses the decision in Brown. Part III ana-
lyzes the decision, first in a discussion of its elimination of weighing and
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing - Nonweighing
Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1347-48 (1995).
3. Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Su-
preme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX. L. REv. 441, 444-46; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1352-53.
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 888-89 (2006).
5. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973-75 (1994).
6. Id. at 972-73.
7. See, e.g., Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 888.
8. 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006).
9. Id at 891-92.
10. See generally Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (holding that in death penalty
cases it is constitutionally permissible for courts to weigh or reweigh aggravating or mitigating
circumstances).
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non-weighing jurisdictions, and then in regard to the risks to future cases
regarding the requirement for appellate review which is strikingly absent
from the opinion. In eliminating the distinction, the Court attempted to
clarify the sentencing process for all jurisdictions, but neglected to dis-
cuss the crucial role of appellate review under the new system.
I. BACKGROUND
Three requirements apply to all death sentences: guided discretion,
individualized sentencing, and appellate review. I When a sentencing
factor used to meet either of the first two requirements is found invalid,
appellate courts have previously determined whether the state is a weigh-
ing or a non-weighing jurisdiction to decide whether the sentence may
stand.12 Appellate review is always a requirement, but any sentence ren-
dered after consideration of invalid sentencing factors may be "re-
weighed" or may go through harmless error analysis during the appellate
process. 13
A. Guided Discretion
Furman v. Georgia14 established that a sentence of death is uncon-
stitutional if a sentencing body had complete discretion in imposing it.
15
The Supreme Court explained that "where discretion is afforded a sen-
tencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a hu-
man life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and ca-
pricious action."1 6 Statutes developed in response to Furman were up-
held if they limited the group of offenders eligible for death, thus guiding
the discretion of the sentencing bodies.' 7 Most jurisdictions now meet
this requirement by defining eligibility factors for the death penalty.18 If
the nature of a crime satisfies the factors required by the state, the sen-
tencer has the opportunity to impose the death sentence.19
11. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 193 (1976) (guided discretion); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (individualized discretion); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890
(1983) (appellate review).
12. E.g., Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2006).
13. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750-54 (1990).
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
15. Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 441-42; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1349.
16. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
17. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874, 879; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1349-50; Marcia A. Widder,
Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty
Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1347-48 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889; see also Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1351 (suggesting
that all guided discretion statutes require a showing of certain aggravated factors before imposing a
death sentence); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994) (explaining that a defendant
cannot be sentenced to death without a finding of at least one "aggravating circumstance," which
serves to limit the number of defendants eligible for the death penalty).
19. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889; see also Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 446 (explaining that a





The second requirement for a constitutional death sentence is that
the jury analyzes any mitigating factors in the circumstances of the crime
or the character of the defendant. 20 This provides an individualized sen-
tence for every offender eligible for death.21 Because of the severity and
finality of the death penalty, the Constitution requires that even if an
offender is found eligible through guided discretion, his character and
circumstances must be weighed against the aggravating factors found by
the sentencer.22 As opposed to their limited discretion in determining
eligibility for death, the individualized sentencing requirement ensures
that juries may consider any mitigating evidence that comes to light.23
Though sentencers may impose the death penalty on eligible offenders,
they may always consider mitigating factors, and they are never required
to issue a sentence of death.24
C. Appellate Review
After Furman, appellate review is a safeguard that has ensured the
constitutionality of death sentences. 25  Gregg v. Georgia26 emphasized
that in a system of guided discretion "the further safeguard of meaningful
appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not im-
posed capriciously or in a freakish manner., 27  The Court in Zant v.
Stephens28 noted that Georgia's sentencing procedure could be approved
in part because every death sentence was reviewed by the state supreme
court "to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportion-
ate."29 In the context of invalid sentencing factors, appellate review be-
comes even more important to prevent an unconstitutional sentence.
Barclay v. Florida30 presents Florida's approach to appellate review
of death sentences. As in many other jurisdictions, there is an automatic
appellate review of any death penalty case by the state supreme court.3'
If a jury used an invalid sentencing factor to determine eligibility for a
20. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982).
21. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950; Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.
22. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950. Though not declared a constitutional requirement in the cases
immediately following Furman v. Georgia, the court recognized prior to its decision in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, that any jury's sentencing procedure involved a balance of the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors of the case. Widder, supra note 17, at 1358.
23. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1353.
24. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (striking down a
mandatory death penalty statute).
25. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. Id.
28. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
29. Zant, 462 U.S. at 876.
30. 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute where the state supreme
court reviewed each death sentence).
31. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 953.
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death sentence, the United States Supreme Court requires either a re-
weighing of all the factors or a harmless-error review if no mitigating
factors are present.32 However, within this review it is accepted that the
sentencing process involves subjective decisions.33 The subjectivity of a
sentencer's decisions is appropriate after the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty has been narrowed. After a defendant is found to
be eligible, the sentencer uses discretion to impose a sentence appropri-
ate to the offense and any mitigating factors.34
When an invalid factor is used in sentencing, appellate review or
harmless-error analysis is required by the Eighth Amendment.35 Barclay
requires that when an invalid factor has been used in a death penalty de-
cision, there be a reweighing of the factors leading to the sentence by
either a jury or an appellate court.36 When an appellate court affirms a
death sentence, there must be no "automatic assumption that [an invalid]
factor has not infected the weighing process., 37 Barclay made it clear
that appellate review is a constitutional requirement for any death sen-
tence involving an invalid sentencing factor.38
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized this precedent in
prior and later cases. In Zant, the Court described "mandatory appellate
review" of a sentence imposed using an invalid sentencing factor as an
"important procedural safeguard" that was necessary to "avoid arbitrari-
ness and assure proportionality" in sentencing.39 When there is a risk of
guided discretion going astray, appellate review is the safety measure
that ensures the constitutionality of a death sentence. Clemons v. Missis-
sippi ° also discussed the importance of "meaningful appellate review" in
cases involving invalid sentencing factors. 4' Though Clemons is most
often cited as an example of a weighing state, the decision rested on the
Mississippi Supreme Court's failure to analyze whether the use of an
invalid sentencing factor was a harmless error. 2
Stringer v. Black4 3 reaffirmed the importance of appellate review in
cases with sentencing errors. 44 The case framed the harmless-error re-
32. See id. at 954-58. Additionally, if a judge imposes a death sentence over the jury's rec-
ommendation, the state supreme court applies a clear and convincing standard to all the facts in
favor of death to determine if the sentence should stand. Id. at 955-56.
33. Id. at 950. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1373.
34. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889; Widder, supra note 17, at 1374.
35. See Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749, 751.
37. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992).
38. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 958.
39. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
40. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
41. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749.
42. Id. at 753-54; see also Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 453.
43. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
44. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 237. But see Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1367 (arguing that Stringer
added harmless-error analysis as a new element to individualized sentencing).
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view requirement in respect to the distinction between weighing and non-
weighing states, which it defined.45 Stringer indicated that where an
appellate court has determined that there would have been no difference
in a sentence without the analysis of an invalid factor, the sentence is
constitutional.46 But the reviewing court may not assume such, and
harmless-error review or appellate reweighing of sentencing factors is
necessary to ensure that an offender has been sentenced individually.
47
Nonetheless, whether the state weighs or does not, an appellate review of
an invalid sentencing factor is a constitutional requirement for a death
sentence to stand.
D. Non-Weighing States
In Zant v. Stephens,48 the Supreme Court addressed a sentence that
had been issued according to Georgia's statutes concerning guided dis-
cretion and individualized sentencing. On appeal, one of the factors
making the defendant eligible for the death penalty was found to be un-
constitutionally vague.49 The Court had to determine whether the use of
the invalid factor in determining eligibility required the sentence to be
vacated.5 °
In Zant, the aggravating (eligibility) factors were used to narrow the
class of offenders eligible for death, but the jury was not required to spe-
cifically analyze those factors in imposing a sentence.5 1 Zant is now
considered to be an analysis of a non-weighing state because of the jury's
ability to consider non-statutory factors in sentencing.52 Georgia's stat-
ute provided that at least one statutory eligibility factor must be found by
a jury for a defendant to become eligible for the death penalty. 53 How-
ever, once a jury found the existence of one of the eligibility factors be-
yond a reasonable doubt, it could examine any other evidence from the
trial proceeding and any mitigating circumstances to determine the final
sentence.54
In Zant, though one factor used in determining eligibility for the
death penalty was found to be invalid, the Court determined that the de-
fendant was still eligible for his sentence, based on the valid eligibility
45. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229. Courts have used the term "weighing" in regard to sentencing
for some time. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 880. Justice Breyer argues in his dissent to Brown v. Sanders
that Stringer v. Black was the first case to codify the distinction between weighing and non-weighing
in jurisdictional approaches to eligibility factors as aggravating factors. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
47. Id.; Widder, supra note 17, at 1344.
48. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
49. Zant, 462 U.S. at 867.
50. Id. at 864.
51. Id. at 879-81; Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 447-48.
52. Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 447-48.
53. Zant, 462 U.S. at 871-72.
54. Id.
2006]
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factors that were found by the jury.55 The purpose of the statutory fac-
tors in Georgia was primarily to guide the discretion of the jury in find-
ing defendants eligible for the death penalty.56 After the jury placed a
defendant beyond that barrier, it had the liberty to base its sentence on all
the evidence before it. 57 The Supreme Court held that the existence of at
least one valid eligibility factor was sufficient to make the defendant
eligible for the death penalty under Georgia law. 58 Although the catego-
rizing of some evidence as an "aggravating circumstance" (as eligibility
factors are termed by Georgia statute) "might have caused the jury to
give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than
it otherwise would have given," the Court did not find this to be a Con-
stitutional error, as the jury properly had all available evidence before it
in determining the sentence. 59 Because the invalid factor was not spe-
cifically a part of the sentencing process (i.e., because the invalid factor
was not given any specific "weight"), the Court upheld the sentence.
60
The Court limited its holding to states with statutory schemes simi-
lar to Georgia's. 61 The opinion distinguished the circumstances in Zant
from a possible case in which a sentencer would be "specifically in-
structed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty." 62 It was
just such a case which elicited the next refinement in death penalty juris-
prudence.
E. Weighing States
Seven years after it decided Zant v. Stephens, the Supreme Court
addressed death sentences imposed with an invalid factor in a jurisdiction
using the same set of factors for determining eligibility (guided discre-
tion) and for imposing sentences (individualized sentencing).63 Clemons
v. Mississippi distinguished "weighing" jurisdictions from those follow-
ing Zant's model.64 Mississippi's statute, unlike Georgia's, used a set of
statutory aggravating circumstances both to determine eligibility for the
death penalty and to determine whether the death penalty was war-
ranted.65 Rather than using any evidence before it to determine the sen-
tence, Mississippi juries were required to "weigh" specific statutory fac-
tors against any mitigating circumstances, also outlined in statute. 66 The
55. Id. at 884, 890.
56. Id. at 875.
57. Id. at 872.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 888-89.
60. Id.; see also Clemons, 494 .U.S. at 744-45; Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 450-5 1.
61. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
62. Id.
63. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1352-53.
64. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744-45; Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 448-49.




jury's task was to determine if there were "insufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 67
The Court found a risk of "skewing" sentences in these jurisdictions
if a jury was instructed to weigh an invalid factor during the sentencing
process.68 It held that such an error did not necessarily invalidate the
death sentence, but that "meaningful appellate review" or a "reweighing"
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was required to preserve a
sentence issued after weighing of an invalid factor.69 If a new jury or an
appellate court determined that the error was harmless, the sentence
could be upheld.70 Because it was not clear in Clemons that the appro-
priate reweighing or review had been performed by the appellate courts,
the death sentence was vacated.7'
The distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions
was crystallized in Stringer v. Black. In reviewing another Mississippi
case, the court clarified the procedures used under Georgia (non-
weighing) and Mississippi (weighing) law:
72
In a nonweighing State, so long as the sentencing body finds at least
one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid ag-
gravating factor does not infect the formal process of deciding
whether death is an appropriate penalty. Assuming a determination
by the state appellate court that the invalid factor would not have
made a difference to the jury's determination, there is no constitu-
tional violation resulting from the introduction of the invalid factor in
an earlier stage of the proceedings. But when the sentencing body is
told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may
not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been
removed from death's side of the scale. When the weighing process
itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or
reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the
defendant received an individualized sentence.
73
In Stringer, one of the aggravating factors used in determining a
sentence was found to be vague or imprecise.74 In a weighing state such
as Mississippi, the sentence could not stand after the use of such a factor,
unless the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were reweighed.75
Because the aggravating factors were "weighed" in the sentencing proc-
ess, as opposed to simply determining eligibility, a sentence in a weigh-
67. Id. at 745 n.2.
68. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
69. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-50.
70. Id. at 748-49; Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 453-54.
71. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54.
72. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231.
73. Id. at 232.
74. Id. at 237.
75. Id.
2006]
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ing state resulting from the use of an invalid factor could not stand with-
out review.76
II. INSTANT CASE-BROWN V. SANDERS
A. Facts
The respondent, Ronald Sanders, and a companion broke into the
home of the two victims. 77  They bound the victims and beat them on
their heads with a blunt object. 78 One victim subsequently died. 79 Sand-
ers was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery,
burglary, and attempted robbery.80 At the eligibility phase of sentencing,
the jury found four special circumstances under California Penal Code
190.281, any of which would have made the defendant eligible for the
death penalty. 82 At sentencing, after considering sentencing factors in-
cluding the special circumstances from the eligibility phase and "the cir-
cumstances of the crime," the jury sentenced the respondent to death8 3
B. Procedural History
The respondent appealed to the California Supreme Court.84  The
supreme court affirmed the death penalty, though it held that two of the
special circumstances found by the jury in the eligibility phase were in-
valid, under the weighing standard from Zant v. Stephens.85 After ex-
haustion of state remedies, 86 the defendant filed a motion for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court of the Eastern District
of California. 87 The district court denied relief.88 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the sentence, on the grounds that the rule
from Zant applied by the state court was not applicable to California as a
weighing state.89 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether California is a weighing or non-weighing state, and
whether the consideration of invalid sentencing factors by the jury re-
quired the sentence to be vacated.90
76. Id.




81. CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.2 (West 2006).




86. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(A) (West 2006).
87. Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 888; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).
88. Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 889.




C. The Majority Decision
Justice Scalia issued the opinion in Brown v. Sanders, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas.
91
He began by distinguishing the two methods currently employed by the
states to meet the narrowing requirement for death sentences required by
Furman v. Georgia.92 Scalia explained the procedures used in sentenc-
ing by weighing and non-weighing states, specifying, however, that all
jurisdictions are required to meet the requirements for guided discretion
and individualized sentencing by allowing a sentencer to weigh the fac-
tors meriting a death sentence with mitigating circumstances.93 Scalia
also devoted extensive dicta at this point to arguing against Justice
Breyer's understanding that all jurisdictions require harmless error re-
view of invalid sentencing factors, as well as highlighting the distinction
between the types of jurisdictions as it was discussed in Stringer.
94
Scalia argued that Zant did not present a requirement for harmless error
review, and that there is no such requirement in non-weighing states cre-
ated in Clemons.95
However, because both types of jurisdictions face similar problems
with invalid factors, the majority declared a new rule, eliminating the
distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions.96 Invalid
sentencing factors will not upset a sentence of death unless analysis of
that factor would provide a jury with facts and circumstances to which it
would not otherwise have access. 97 The trigger of a requirement for
harmless error review would be the presentation of new facts to a sen-
tencer that it would not have seen without analysis of an invalid sentenc-
ing factor.
98
Scalia argued that part of the reasoning for the elimination of the
distinction is that most jurisdictions allow evidence to be presented to the
sentencer through an eligibility factor or a sentencing factor, but that not
all states fit neatly into the weighing/non-weighing categorization.99 He
noted that even in states that were placed by the court into one of the two
categories, the particular scheme may have had elements of both.100
The opinion noted that under the former classification, California
would have been a non-weighing state, validating the death sentence in
91. Id. at 884.
92. Id. at 889-91.
93. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889-91.
94. Id. at 891 n.3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 891-92.
97. Id. at 892.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 891-92.
100. Id. at 892 n.5 (discussing Stringer's use of an invalidated aggravating circumstance that
was not an eligibility factor).
2006]
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Brown under both the old and new systems. 1 1 Because the sentencing
jury was able to consider the facts and circumstances related to the inva-
lid factors under the heading of another valid factor, the majority held
that the sentencing process was not skewed, and that the sentence was
constitutional. 1
02
D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent, in which he is joined by Justice Souter, ar-
gued that the majority failed to address the question on which certiorari
was granted.10 3 The issue presented to the Court was whether California
is a weighing state.' 4 Though the majority did provide an answer to this
question, Stevens maintained that the Court's choice to change settled
sentencing law will complicate future decisions, and does not address the
concerns presented by the California court in that context. 0 5
E. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, reiterated that the ques-
tion on certiorari was whether California is a weighing state.0 6 How-
ever, Breyer argued that the more important issue for sentence review
should turn on the nature of the sentencing error at trial rather than on the
category of the issuing jurisdiction.17 Appellate review of all death sen-
tences rendered using invalid sentencing factors should be concerned
with whether an error in sentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1
0 8
Breyer discussed his opinion in regard to the two stages of sentenc-
ing that he found relevant in all jurisdictions, though he mentioned
briefly that some states combine the stages into one proceeding.'0 9 First,
sentencers determine eligibility for the death penalty, and only after this
process do they weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating cir-
cumstances (often in the form of eligibility factors)." 0 Breyer argued
that both types of jurisdictions face the same risks when juries consider
invalid sentencing factors: giving undue weight to an issue or piece of
evidence that should not have been under consideration."' Because in-
formation is presented under the rubric of an aggravating factor, it is
101. Id. at 893.
102. Id. at 894.




107. Id. at 898.
108. Id. at 896, 898.
109. Id. at 896-97.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 898-99.
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unduly weighted for sentencers whether or not they may consider addi-
tional factors."12
Breyer read the decisions in Zant and Clemons, though they created
the weighing/non-weighing distinction, as turning on the harmlessness of
the errors made at trial: "Despite the Court's occasional suggestion to the
contrary, the weighing/nonweighing distinction has little to do with the
need to determine whether the error was harmless ... reviewing courts
should decide if that error was harmful, regardless of the form a State's
death penalty law takes."" 3 Breyer discussed the prejudice that can re-
sult from a sentencer's consideration of an invalid sentencing factor,
reiterating that much of the distinction between the types of jurisdictions
does not accurately reflect the statutory constructions of a number of
states. 14 Breyer presented California as an example of the failure of the
categories, as a state which presents one set of factors for guided discre-
tion, and which adds additional factors (which define but do not limit the
circumstances considered) for the individualized sentencing procedure.15
He analyzed Stringer v. Black as the first case to frame the appellate
review process as a weighing/non-weighing issue, and to equate invalid
factors in non-weighing states with harmless error automatically.' 6 For
Breyer, this is not an accurate depiction of death penalty jurisprudence.
He also found that Scalia denied the importance of the emphasis placed
on sentencing evidence inconsistently with Clemons, and "diminishe[d]
the need to conduct any harmless-error review at all." ' 1 7 The majority
decision to treat any error that does not present new evidence as harmless
will limit the actual and necessary harmless-error review in many death
penalty cases to come."
8
III. ANALYSIS
This comment addresses Brown v. Sanders'19 in the light of capital
sentencing precedent, and questions its impact on future cases. It com-
mends the majority for the elimination of the distinction between weigh-
ing and non-weighing jurisdictions, as this will clarify the issues sur-
rounding invalid sentencing factors. However, it questions the opinion's
failure to set a universal standard for appellate review under the new
scheme.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 898, 900-02.
114. Id. at 898-900.
115. Id. at 900.
116. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902.
117. Id. at 903.
118. See id. at 903-04.
119. 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006).
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A. Attempting to Clarify Invalid Factor Issues - Eliminating the Weight
The majority in Brown eliminated the developing distinction be-
tween weighing and non-weighing states 120 that has been in the back-
ground of invalid factor cases since Zant v. Stephens. z12  The Stringer v.
Black decision considered that distinction to be of "critical impor-
tance," 122 but the lengthy analysis of the distinction in that opinion has
not been easy to understand. The majority and Breyer's dissent in Brown
followed different interpretations of the rule presented in Stringer, 23 and
lower courts could easily share the confusion.
The decision in Brown recognized that categorizing states as weigh-
ing or non-weighing 24 was not accurate and did not solve the problem
inherent in sentences imposed after consideration of invalid factors.
125
As one scholar noted, "[t]hat nonweighing states retain the weighing
metaphor to describe the sentencing process suggests that the distinction
the Court has created an illusion. Moreover, the distinction has engen-
dered confusion and led to incoherent decisions.' ' 126 The weighing/non-
weighing distinction raised concerns that the same analysis took place in
both types of jurisdictions, that the terms used in distinguishing the juris-
dictions provided undue weight to sentencing factors, and that the states
could not be broken into the two categories previously recognized by the
Supreme Court.
1. Similar Analysis Across Jurisdictions
The Scalia opinion argued that the distinction between weighing
and non-weighing jurisdictions can be eliminated because the same es-
sential process of balancing aggravating and mitigating factors is used by
all juries. 127 This view was the foundation for the opinion's emphasis on
what evidence the jury has access to during the sentencing process. 128 in
the instant case:
[T]he jury's consideration of the invalid eligibility factors in the
weighing process did not produce constitutional error because all the
facts and circumstances admissible to establish [the invalid factors]
were also properly adduced as aggravating facts bearing upon the
"circumstances of the crime" sentencing factor. They were properly
120. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
121. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888 n.24 (1983); see also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,
229 (1992).
122. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231-32.
123. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891 n.3.
124. See Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231-32.
125. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891-92.
126. Widder, supra note 18, at 1365 (noting an Illinois decision which mischaracterized the
state as a weighing jurisdiction, relying on the analysis provided in Stringer).
127. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
128. See id. at 892.
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considered whether or not they bore upon the invalidated eligibility
factors. 1
29
This is the justification the Court relied upon for the Brown deci-
sion, 3° but there were other points in favor of eliminating the distinction
as well.
2. Weighing Terminology Skewed Analysis of Sentencing Factors
Some scholarship on the weighing/non-weighing distinction fo-
cused on the terms used by the courts as much as on their analysis.
When a jury is given a set of facts and circumstances, increased signifi-
cance is given those which are recognized by statute or considered to be
automatically "aggravating," no matter whether the jurisdiction offi-
cially "weighs" those factors or not. 131 One analysis of Clemons v. Mis-
sissippi highlighted the importance of these labels to a sentencing jury,
and the inconsistent treatment of it by the Court:
The underlying rationale of the Clemons opinion must be that the
jury goes about its decisionmaking [sic] process in a different way
when it is explicitly instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Otherwise the distinction makes little sense -- if the
thought process is the same as it is in a nonweighing state, then either
no reweighing is required or the sentence must be reweighed under
both types of statutory schemes.1
32
In distinguishing between two types of statutes when Clemons was
decided, the Court may have allowed an inconsistency between the treat-
ment of Zant and Clemons to become law. 133 The Court's somewhat
backward terminology 34 further muddied the waters, giving jurisdictions
two categories based on the word "weigh," while the distinction was
actually based on the limitation of factors presented to the jury, rather
than what it does with them.1 35 In relying on this inconsistency, courts
may have been lulled into using a metaphor that is unrelated to the actual
statutes determining sentencing procedure.
136
3. The Distinction Was Illusory
A concern in Breyer's dissent to Brown was that it is rarely possible
to cleanly categorize jurisdictions as weighing or non-weighing.
1 37
While some states do mirror the classic weighing or non-weighing para-
129. Id. at 894.
130. Id.
131. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1370-71.
132. Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 455.
133. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 873-74; Clemons, 494 U.S. at 743-44.
134. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889, 898.
135. See Id.
136. Widder, supra note 17, at 1363-64.
137. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 898 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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digms of Zant and Clemons, others "fall somewhere in between.,
138
California is one example, using specific factors for eligibility, and add-
ing factors to the list to be used in sentencing. 139 Also, as noted in Zant,
states are not required to follow sentencing schemes such as Georgia's in
order to meet the Furman v. Georgia requirement for guided discre-
tion.140 If a state were to choose a different system for narrowing its
class of capital offenders, it might have no place at all in the weigh-
ing/non-weighing scheme.
Breyer also noted that some jurisdictions have combined the eligi-
bility and sentencing stages into one sentencing process.14 1 In such a
jurisdiction, there may be no way for an appellate review to determine
what evidence is limited to eligibility and what is limited to sentence
selection, and there is less chance that a jury would make such a distinc-
tion. Though the use of the weighing and non-weighing categories had
been useful for analyzing several specific statutes, it does not seem that it
was suited to bear the entire weight of capital sentencing. The Court
used it as an explanatory tool, but it may never have been intended as a
means of determining the constitutionality of all sentences. As one critic
noted, "[t]he Supreme Court's weighing doctrines allow procedure to
distort substance in an area of law in which it is acutely necessary that
procedural rules be finely tuned to promote substantive law." 142 It is
clear from Brown's ease in removing the distinction,1 43 as well as from
the complicated analysis engendered from its use' 44 that the termination
of classifying jurisdictions as weighing or non-weighing will not hinder
substantive law in capital sentencing.
B. Unseen Risks? Where Is the Emphasis on Appellate Review?
Though Brown attempts to clarify sentencing decisions, it contains a
flaw that could have serious repercussions. While it does not overturn
any existing law on appellate reweighing or harmless-error review, the
opinion fails to make this crucial element of invalid factor analysis clear
for lower courts to apply along with its new rule on evidentiary analysis
by trial juries. Appellate review, which may consist of reweighing of
sentencing factors or a harmless-error review to determine the impact of
the consideration of an invalid factor, is an important element of the de-
cisions in invalid sentencing factor precedent. 145 Stringer's discussion of
harmless-error review and appellate review has led to completely differ-
ent interpretations of the requirement. With the consolidation of weigh-
138. Id. at 900..
139. Id.
140. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874-75.
141. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 900.
142. Widder, supra note 17, at 1346.
143. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
144. Widder, supra note 17, at 1365; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232-33.
145. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749; Zant, 462 U.S. at 888, 890; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 236.
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ing and non-weighing jurisdictions, jurists must exercise care that this
constitutional requirement does not fall by the wayside.
1. Appellate Review in Capital Sentencing Precedent
The Brown decision highlighted the need for harmless-error review
in weighing jurisdictions, 146 but the requirement for appellate review is
not limited to those states. Zant recognized appellate review as an "im-
portant procedural safeguard."' 147  It also made clear that whether the
analysis of an invalid factor is a constitutional error depends on the spe-
cific circumstances of a case. 148 Though Zant is an example of a case in
which a sentence imposed using an invalid factor stood, the sentence was
only validated through appellate review.
The decision in Clemons hinged on the importance of appellate re-
view in the form of reweighing of sentencing factors. 49 The case recog-
nized that a harmless-error review of some kind took place, but the Su-
preme Court held that it was insufficient under the circumstances. 50 The
Clemons decision did not outline the exact requirement for appellate re-
view after consideration of an invalid factor, but it was made clear that
reweighing or appellate review of some kind was necessary after a sen-
tencer considered an invalid sentencing factor.' 51 The Court acknowl-
edged that the state court's reliance on one valid circumstance for sen-
tencing152 was "not conducting appellate reweighing as we understand
the concept,"' 53 and reversed the state court's decision.154 Later analysis
of this case indicates an understanding of the importance of appellate
review, but case law presents no clear distinction between the general
requirement for appellate review of death sentences and the specific
processes of reweighing of factors' 55 and harmless-error review.' 56 Un-
fortunately, while Scalia devoted discussion to harmless error review in
regard to his digression on Breyer's dissent, he did not clarify its role in
the new system. 57 This may be the basis for Breyer's fear that harmless
error review will no longer occur at all.' 58
146. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890.
147. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
148. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749-50.
150. Id. at 740, 753.
151. Id. at 740.
152. Id. at 751.
153. Id. at 752.
154. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1353 n.133 ("The Clemons Court did not explain its myste-
rious distinction between harmess-error analysis and reweighing aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors.").
155. See Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 453-54.
156. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 891 n.3 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Appellate review as a constitutional requirement was set out in Bar-
clay159, and has remained an element of invalid sentencing factor deci-
sions since. However, the precise requirements for appellate review have
not been set out, and the repercussions of the vague standard are apparent
in Brown's lack of discussion on the issue and in Breyer's dissent. 160 In
fact, the only mention of appellate review in the decision that is not dicta
for the benefit of Breyer is a procedural note of the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing that a harmless-error review was necessary. 6 ' Nonetheless, scholar-
ship recognizes the appellate review requirement based on the line of
cases on invalid sentencing factors. 162 What its requirements are, and
how the terms used differ in meaning, remain a murky area not yet clari-
fied by the courts. 16 3 The appellate review requirement is an area that
has not been adequately explored, and which may be the source of the
confusion and differing interpretations of Stringer.
2. The Confusing Heritage of Stringer
Stringer recognized that an appellate review of a death sentence
took place at the state level. 164 It reiterated the general requirement of
"appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating fac-
tors"' 65 and clarified the Clemons requirement that at least in weighing
jurisdictions, there must be harmless-error review.1 66 However, where
Stringer fits into non-weighing jurisdictions and how it affects future
sentences167 is a subject of disagreement.
Some instances within Stringer seem to apply to invalid factor sen-
tencing in general. 168 Consider the final statement of the Stringer court
before its reversal order: "the precedents even before Maynard and
Clemons yield a well-settled principle: Use of a vague or imprecise ag-
gravating factor in the weighing process invalidates the sentence and at
the very least requires constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweigh-
ing in the state judicial system."' 69 There is no question that Stringer is
an example of a weighing state. 170 Nonetheless, as Clemons was the first
example of a weighing jurisdiction to be presented to the United States
Supreme Court,' 7' any precedent prior to it must have referred to a non-
weighing jurisdiction. Thus, it would seem that the proposition in
159. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 1941 (1983).
160. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 901.
161. Id. at 889.
162. Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 442; Widder, supra note 17, at 1344, 1354.
163. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1370 n.133.
164. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 234.
165. Id. at 230.
166. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1368.
167. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889.
168. See Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230-31, 236.
169. Id. at 237.
170. See id. at 232.
171. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744-45.
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Stringer requiring appellate reweighing or harmless-error review 172 ap-
plies to both types of jurisdictions.
Justice Scalia, in his Brown opinion, vehemently disagreed with this
point: "Justice Breyer contends that harmless-error review applies in
both weighing and non-weighing States. It would be strange indeed to
discover at this late stage that our long-held distinction between the two
sorts of States for purposes of reviewing invalid eligibility factors in fact
made no difference."1 73 Justice Scalia did not mention in this note the
other purported differences between the types of jurisdictions, such as
the use of limited sentencing factors in weighing states versus broad or
unlimited factors or circumstances in sentencing in non-weighing
states. 174 Scalia, in recognizing that harmless error review is an impor-
tant element at least in weighing jurisdictions, seemed to recognize that
there is a role for appellate review of sentences rendered using invalid
factors even under the new system. 75 Unfortunately, Scalia made no
mention of this role in the body of the case.
1 76
Justice Scalia perhaps overstated Justice Breyer's interpretation of
Stringer. Breyer's contention that harmless-error review is necessary in
all jurisdictions is based on Zant and Clemons.177 As to Stringer, Breyer
discussed its reference to non-weighing cases specifically as a "single
ambiguous sentence of dicta" that should not be a basis for future law.
178
Other scholarship indicates the same divergent interpretations of
Stringer, some interpretations indicating that reweighing and harmless-
error review apply only to weighing states, 179 and others applying it to
both types.180 There have also been no definitions of "appellate reweigh-
ing" or "harmless-error review" beyond the references in cases such as
Clemons and Stringer. The terms may or may not be interchangeable:
"Regardless of the validity of assessing capital sentencing errors under a
harmless-error analysis, it remains unclear how harmless-error review is
functionally different from appellate reweighing of aggravating and miti-
gating factors in evaluating the effect of invalid aggravating factors on a
death sentence."18' With no consensus on terms, and no consensus on
what is a rule and what is dicta, or to which jurisdictions rules apply to, it
is no small wonder that Stringer has been the source of confusion and
discord. Nonetheless, Brown and its followers must still apply the re-
quirement of appellate review to invalid factor sentencing.
172. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230.
173. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891 n.3 (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 890.
175. See id. at 891 n.4.
176. See id. at 892.
177. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 900-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Widder, supra note 17, at 1344.
180. Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1367.
181. Widder, supra note 17, at 1371 n.133.
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3. What Is Required for Appellate Review after Brown?
Despite the uniformity of capital sentencing jurisprudence at the
Supreme Court level, there are varied opinions on what is required as far
as appellate review of sentences based on invalid factors. One extreme
holds that an erring sentence cannot ever stand: "When a sentence of
death has been based in part on invalid aggravating factors, the only
remedy faithful to the Eighth Amendment is to reverse the sentence and
remand for a new sentencing proceeding."' 82 An approach foreseen by
Justice Breyer based on the majority opinion in Brown is a limiting of the
appellate review requirement. 83 Breyer's favored approach stands be-
tween these points, more in line with prior cases: "A reviewing court
must find that the jury's consideration of an invalid aggravator was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the form a State's
death penalty law takes. ' 84 Based on sentencing precedent, it seems
unlikely that there will be any changes in the requirements for a constitu-
tional death sentence. But these alternative approaches to sentencing
indicate a continued recognition of the vital role appellate sentencing
takes.
Future cases will rely on Brown as well as on its predecessors, and
one could wish that the opinion had made the Court's stance on appellate
review clear within the decision that changed standing law from a two-
pronged to a unified system. Without the distinctions of weighing or
non-weighing states to rely on, lower courts may find themselves at a
loss for what rule of appellate review to apply. Justice Scalia, in devot-
ing space to arguing with Justice Breyer over what is not required under
a now obsolete classification, failed to address the standard of review
required in all jurisdictions under the new rule. 185 Even if Stringer
clearly outlined the requirements for weighing states 86 (which is a de-
batable proposition in itself), there is no new law as to what is required
for the jurisdictions as they are now unified. So, it seems that lower
courts must continue to rely on the law as it was defined in Zant, "the
mandatory appellate review of each death sentence ....
If the Court chooses to clarify its stance on appellate review in a fu-
ture decision, the prudent course may be an approach which applies the
most stringent standard. If weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions are
no longer distinct, the level of review required should be that required for
weighing jurisdictions, which previously held a greater risk of harmful
error. 88  According to the most recent appellate review precedent,
182. Id. at 1346.
183. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 896.
185. See id. at 891 n.3 (majority opinion).
186. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
187. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
188. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
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Stringer, the new rule for all invalid factor sentencing cases would be
that "[w]hen the weighing process itself has been skewed, only constitu-
tional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level
suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sen-
tence." 89 If, as Justice Scalia stated, all jurisdictions require a weighing
of aggravating and mitigating factors, 19° it seems only appropriate that all
jurisdictions now be considered weighing jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
Brown v. Sanders represents forward progress in its elimination of
the unwieldy distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdic-
tions in the treatment of invalid sentencing factors. However, it fails to
bring up to date the law on the appellate review requirement of erring
capital sentencing cases, and thus could present future problems. The
most prudent course would be for the Court to clearly outline the re-
quirement for all cases sentenced under invalid factors to be subjected to
reweighing of the sentencing factors or a harmless-error review. The
necessity for meaningful appellate review cannot be understated in the
case of sentencing error. As the Court exhorted in Zant v. Stephens: "be-
cause there is a qualitative difference between death and any other per-
missible form of punishment, 'there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment. ... ",,91 Precedent provides a foundation for reliability through
appellate review, but it is the responsibility of the Court to make it law.
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